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Introduction: A changing world and its consequences 
During the recent World EXPO in Shanghai, most African countries 
were housed under one roof, a huge building bustling with activity. 
The African dances and the loud drumming attracted many Chinese 
visitors, who were amazed, thrilled and shocked at the same time. The 
African market stalls (see book cover) were also popular. EXPO’s 
title was ‘Better City, Better Life’, and the organisers had tried to 
convince the African contributors that it would be nice to stick to that 
general theme. Few did, even after accepting generous Chinese sup-
port. Many of the African pavilions showed rural Africa as a paradise 
for investors and tourists, with scenes of Africa’s exotic nature and 
people and with a general message that Africa is a continent full of 
resources to exploit (cf. Dietz 2011: 5). But on whose terms? EXPO’s 
experience may be seen as symbolic of Africa being quite capable of 
carving out its own negotiation space. The world’s emerging multi-
polarity creates obvious tensions but also opportunities for the many 
different African players on the world’s geopolitical chessboard.  
 
Consider the following one out of many Sino-African encounters cur-
rently taking place within Africa: 
In Senegal, near Touba, the religious capital of the Murids (a Senegalese 
Islamic sufi order), a new road was inaugurated. This road had been financed 
and built by the Chinese, and, for the inauguration, the Senegalese president 
had come with a large following of officials, as well as the Chinese consul 
and his entourage. Important representatives of the religious elite from Touba 
attended the ceremony, too. There were many speeches, and the Chinese 
consul met with much enthusiasm when he spoke some words in vernacular. 
The crowd applauded the president, the religious leaders, and the consul. The 
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Murid leaders thanked the president, and the president self-assuredly took his 
time to receive their blessings before thanking the consul. In the meantime, 
in Dakar, traders were preparing a protest against the invasion of the Sene-




It is clear that today’s world is not the world of the 1990s and – not 
surprising to Africans or Africanists but perhaps to others – this also 
holds true when viewed from the African continent. With the end of 
the Cold War, the world seemed to move from a bipolar system to a 
unipolar world in which the neoliberal West globally imposes its 
laws. However, during the last decade it has been acknowledged that 
other actors, such as China, India and Brazil, have become increas-
ingly influential, creating multipolarity at the global level (DIE 2006; 
Dollar 2007; Clegg 2009). It is important to understand what this 
emerging multipolarity means for Africa. Will Africa fall victim to a 
new scramble over raw materials and political hegemony between 
superpowers (e.g. Lee 2006)? Or does this new multipolarity offer 
African countries greater room for negotiation and manoeuvring, 
eventually leading to stronger democracy, enhanced growth, and 
increased possibilities to address their own problems (e.g. Alden 
2008; Vittorini & Harris 2009)? 
From a Western perspective, non-Western actors intervening in 
Africa are often considered as mere geopolitical players. Transnati-
onal Islamic NGOs, for instance, are usually portrayed as part of a 
hegemonic project of the Arab world (Kaag 2007). The same tend-
ency can be recognised in discussions about Chinese interventions, in 
which it is often stressed that these interventions are merely led by 
the demand for raw materials. This may be partly true, but there is 
more to it. Different layers have to be distinguished, as is illustrated 
by the Senegalese example above. Apart from the strategies of super-
powers, there are also the ideologies and objectives of intervening 
organisations, the views and actions of the representatives of these 
organisations in Africa, and the ways in which African actors attract 
and respond to these external interventions and use them in their own 
complex strategies (Nolutshungu 1996; see also Kaag 2008). What 
also matters is that the number of emerging players seems to increase: 
ever more Asian, Latin American and Middle Eastern governments, 
businesses and cultural organisations appear on the scene, partly mak-
                                                 
1  www.ht.com (Last accessed: May 2008). Kaag fieldwork notes, 2008. 
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ing use of existing footholds (e.g. the Indians in Mauritius, Southern 
and Eastern Africa; the Lebanese in West Africa; Lusophone connect-
ions for the Brazilians), partly coming seemingly ‘out of the blue’.  
Taking a longer-term perspective on Africa, the interventions of 
these ‘new’ actors are feeding into ongoing processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, both in the economic and political sphere. Important ques-
tions include how linkages with these non-Western actors are shaping 
the integration in the world market of African social groups, African 
countries, and of Africa as a whole. Are current business and govern-
ing elites monopolising contacts with these ‘new’ actors? Or are their 
interventions offering opportunities for other social categories, es-
pecially upcoming or counter-elites, to enhance their positions? They 
may do so by linking to such initiatives but also by publicly resisting 
them. Especially the rivalry between different Western and non-
Western development partners may offer opportunities for actors in 
African society (ranging from local groups to the African Union) to 
enhance their position. What does all this mean for the current sys-
tems of transnational governmentality (Ferguson 2006; Olsen, this 
volume) and for the negotiating position of African elites therein? 
And what are the effects on processes of inclusion and exclusion in 
wider African society (Large 2008)? These are among the questions 
that this book seeks to address. How is Africa and how are Africans 
engaging the emerging multipolar world? Does the new situation 
offer the opportunity to get rid of the neoliberal system that many 
Africans feel has been enforced on them (Amoah, this volume)? Or 
has the neoliberal era set in motion dynamics that have taken an in-
dependent course and are difficult to stop, even after the crumbling of 
the system that has produced them (see, for instance, Büscher in this 
volume)?  
It is clear that Africa is currently undergoing dramatic changes 
both politically and economically. In northern Africa, in early 2011, a 
process of change from below challenged and overturned major and 
long-standing regimes, including those in Egypt and Tunisia. The 
political implications of these changes for Sub-Saharan Africa are 
difficult to predict. Some African countries are experiencing rapid 
economic growth (Dietz 2011: 21-2). However, most of the conti-
nent’s dynamic sectors, such as minerals, gold and precious stones, 
and tourism and biofuel development are to a large extent influenced 
and controlled by external interests. In addition, many of the elites 
and bureaucracies of oil- and mineral-rich countries are controlling 
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the economic rents for their own benefit (Barnes 2005). The econo-
mic growth has thus not been inclusive, and, with a few exceptions 
(Botswana is always mentioned), benefits have not been passed on to 
the broader population. Poverty hence still remains deep in the re-
gion.  
In the early post-colonial era, African governments were strongly 
engaged in promoting strategies of economic modernisation within 
the frame of the new nation states, with ‘nation’ a notion of sub-
stantial confusion. The period from the early 1960s into the 1970s 
saw African economies enjoy considerable economic growth as well 
as major improvements in education, health services and water 
supply. The need for weak African regimes to consolidate the nation 
states, however, also led to growing authoritarianism coupled with 
desires to engage with the world on their own terms. However, this 
was circumscribed by the existence of the Cold War, which presented 
constraints for the content and direction of the African engagements, 
but also opportunities for external support. For instance, a country 
like Tanzania charted its own development strategy in the 1960s and 
also benefited from playing external donors against each other (see 
Liu and Monson, this volume). The African post-colonial develop-
ment model was, however, supported by favourable international eco-
nomic conjunctures until the oil crisis in 1973 and the subsequent 
global economic stagnation. African countries were gradually im-
mersed in political, economic and social crises. These crises changed, 
in important ways, the engagement of Africa with the external world.  
The US and its Western allies had already in the early 1980s made 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank impose 
economic conditionalities for their further support to African states. 
These neoliberal reforms emphasised state withdrawal and increasing 
space for the private sector to unfold. The first phase emphasised 
“getting the prices right” (World Bank 1981) as a general remedy for 
recovery of economic growth. However, when the expected outcomes 
did not emerge (Zagah 2005), the focus shifted to creating a broader 
‘enabling environment’ for development in Africa, which emphasised 
institutional aspects (World Bank 1989; Gibbon et al. 1993). African 
states on their side attempted to chart their own response to the crises 
through the Lagos Plan of Action in 1983 and economic reform pro-
grammes through the Economic Commission for Africa in the late 
1980s. However, these initiatives had limited impact (see also Derbe, 
this volume). 
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After the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, Africa’s engagement 
with the world changed to the direction of democracy and human 
rights. The shift was once more externally driven – primarily by the 
US and her allies, who wished to legitimise the new unipolar world 
order by emphasising such values. The 1990s hence saw the West im-
posing both political (Western-style multi-party systems) and econo-
mic market reform on Africa. The reform processes spread throughout 
Africa, whereas the more authoritarian Asian countries, enjoying high 
economic growth rates since the 1980s, did not experience similar 
external reform demands. However, Asian countries which had em-
braced economic liberalisation also experienced a severe financial 
crisis from 1997 onwards. Countries that had pursued more protecti-
onist economic strategies, such as China, India, Vietnam and Malay-
sia, were less influenced and continued their economic growth almost 
unabated. 
After the attack on the Twin Towers in New York in September 
2001, the weakening of the US became increasingly manifest both 
politically and economically. The subsequent ‘war on terror’ led to 
drastic set-backs for global human rights, enormous economic costs 
for America, and untold human and material suffering in the countries 
against which the US and her allies waged war (Iraq and Afghani-
stan). Gradually, Europe was also being weakened economically. The 
financial and economic crises in late 2008 contributed further to this 
development.  
In the meantime, new global actors (Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey, 
South Africa) have entered the geopolitical scene, while older players 
(China, India) have gained a renewed visibility and enlarged their 
domain of intervention. China is today Africa’s third-largest trading 
partner after the US and France. The Chinese development aid to 
Africa is also expanding rapidly, and by 2009 it had spent about 6.3 
billion USD in Africa (Ong’ayo, this volume). In addition, India now 
has a presence in all African states. At the peak of the global financial 
crisis, the figure for India’s trade with Africa had reached an astonish-
ing 46 billion USD in 2009, up from 36 billion USD of the previous 
year. Despite still being less than half of all China’s trade in the 
continent, this represents a 15-fold increase from a mere 3 billion 
USD in 2002. The buoyancy of this fast-growing economic relation is 
so great that the trade between India and Africa is expected to reach 
70 billion USD in the next few years and even surpass this figure by 
2015 (Vittorini & Harris, this volume). 
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The question of the influence of rising international actors in 
Africa has been adopted by the scholarly community, reflected in 
particular in the increasing number of studies on China in Africa (e.g. 
Mepham & Wild 2006; Alden 2007; Melber & Lee 2007; van Dijk 
2009; Cheru & Obi 2010). These studies show the various ways in 
which China has been involved in Africa (aid, trade, investment) and 
critically assess the rationale for its presence. We feel, however, that 
despite the wealth of knowledge these recent studies have yielded, 
important scholarly challenges remain. First, most studies have fo-
cused on one particular international actor and its involvement in 
Africa and have not taken multipolarity as the central object of re-
search. It is, however, the diversification of available partners that is 
one of the most important recent changes when viewed from an 
African perspective. Second, studies have largely focused on the 
actions and strategies of external actors, thus overlooking African 
agencies and the ways they may co-shape new global relationships. 
Third, most studies have taken the state level as the level of analysis. 
Such a state-centric perspective prevents one from exploring how 
emerging global players’ involvement in Africa might not only chal-
lenge global power constellations, but also reconfigure power constel-
lations at a more local level (Evers et al., this volume) or contribute to 
new transnational configurations (Nauta, this volume).  
Therefore, by taking multipolarity as the central focus and by 
highlighting the agency of Africa in co-shaping the new global world 
order, while also adopting a historically sensitive approach, this book 
serves to document and analyse the new developments described in 
the foregoing. What are the continuities and what are the changes in 
Africa’s position in the world? How does African agency play a role 
and co-shape the emerging multipolar world order? The contributions 
in this book show that African engagements take numerous forms on 
different terms and that relations of power and opportunities are con-
stantly negotiated and re-negotiated, at local, national, international 
and transnational levels. Moreover, in a continent with over one 
billion people, there will be mutual and conflicting interests and 
engagements, both with regards to Africa in relation to the multipolar 
world, as well as within and among African nations, regions, commu-
nities and organisations. In addition, the continent has been colonised, 
exploited and deprived of natural and human resources, a fact which 
informs the ways in which Africa is currently engaging in the world.  
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In view of the observation that in the analysis of an emerging 
multipolar world African agency is still rather marginally considered, 
we think it important to reflect a little further on this issue before 
turning to the contributions to the present volume. In the following 
section, we will explore some of the reasons why it often appears so 
difficult to take African agency seriously (having their roots in the 
colonial past) and consider some recent thinking on African agency 
and engagements. 
African engagements:  
The importance of taking African agency seriously 
When Napoleon Bonaparte stood among his troops next to the pyra-
mids after he had conquered Egypt in 1798, he proclaimed: “Soldiers, 
forty centuries of history look down upon you!” Although the history 
of colonisation in Africa is older, the French conquest began a new 
era for understanding Africa, African engagements and Africa’s place 
in world history. To whom does ancient Egyptian history belong? And 
how can different understandings of the Egyptian past shed light on 
African engagements? By using the ancient Egyptian civilisation as 
an example, it is possible to describe two radical and opposite views 
regarding African agency and engagements (and, of course, there are 
many views in between these extremes): one which sees Africans as 
incapable of cultural development and totally dependent upon 
external influences (from the West, the Near East and Asia), and the 
other which sees Africans as the major contributors to and developers 
of civilisations within Africa and beyond. Perhaps with the exception 
of Australia, no other continent has been so deprived of acknow-
ledgement for having played any role in cultural progress and global 
development as Africa. However, perceptions of the ‘backward’ con-
tinent were challenged by the ancient Egyptian civilisation. 
What made Napoleon’s Africa expedition different from other 
European colonisations was that the army was accompanied by a 
special Scientific and Artistic Commission. This commission was 
carefully selected and was to provide a cultural and technological 
background to Napoleon’s further plans to colonise the Nile valley. 
The commission consisted of 167 scientists and technicians – a truly 
inter-disciplinary team at the time. In particular, the pyramids fasci-
nated these scholars, and few scientific expeditions have left such a 
legacy. The result of this expedition was an enormous work: the 
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twenty-volume Description de l’Égypte, published between 1809 and 
1828. Although the Egyptian monuments were known before Napo-
leon’s conquest, the Description was a catalyst for Egyptian studies 
and generated in Europe a wide public interest in Egypt, which also 
resulted in intensive robbing and looting of Egyptian antiquities 
(Fagan 2004: 47-56). Importantly, Egypt and the pyramids placed the 
big questions regarding Africa’s development and Africans’ engage-
ments and agencies in the world in focus. 
Historically, since colonial times, a recurring debate on Africa’s 
development and engagements has focused on whether unique inno-
vations emerged in the continent itself or were the results of a dif-
fusion of cultural and technological innovations from more advanced 
cultures and civilisations. In the history of Africa, the models which 
have been used to understand the continent’s people and development 
have had political implications, since “models of reality have a tend-
ency to convert into models for reality” (van Beek 2007: 311). Archa-
eology has had a prominent role in the processes of colonialism and 
nationalism, and as the archaeologist Bruce Trigger says: “Colonialist 
archaeology ... served to denigrate native societies and peoples by 
trying to demonstrate that they had been static in prehistoric times 
and lacked the initiative to develop on their own” (Trigger 1984: 
363). Moreover, “(w)hile the colonisers had every reason to glorify 
their own past, they had no reason to extol the past of the peoples 
they were subjugating and supplanting. Indeed, they sought by em-
phasising the primitiveness and lack of accomplishments of these 
peoples to justify their own poor treatment of them” (Trigger 1984: 
360). In the nineteenth century, such a philosophy was brutally 
expressed by, for instance, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, who proclaimed that Africa “is no historical part of 
the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical 
movements in it – that is in its northern part – belong to the Asiatic or 
European World” (Hegel 2007 [1899]: 99) and that the Africans are 
“capable of no development or culture, and as we see them at this 
day, such have they always been” (ibid. 98). Africans were denied 
any engagements, agencies and even humanity.  
This political agenda of Sub-Saharan or ‘black’ Africa was sub-
sumed in Western notions of Africa. However, the ‘Egyptian problem’ 
persisted: how could Africa have produced such a remarkable and 
astonishing civilisation? Europeans solved the problem by not in-
cluding Egypt in their concept of ‘Africa’: “Egypt will be considered 
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in reference to the passage of the human mind from its Eastern to its 
Western phase, but it does not belong to the African Spirit” (Hegel 
2007 [1899]: 99). Africa was thus denied the capability of independ-
ent and autonomous development and cultural and technological in-
novations, which were seen as coming from the Near East and Asia.  
Colonial archaeology saw Sub-Saharan Africa as a living, al-
though largely static, museum of the past. Technical, cultural and 
political achievements in the past and present were underestimated, 
viewed basically as diffusion from the north, and assigned to pre-
historic, so-called Hamitic peoples (Trigger 1984: 362). From this 
perspective it was these so-called Hamites who could explain the 
marvellous Egyptian civilisation. The myth about the Hamites comes 
from the Old Testament. Ham was one of Noah’s three sons; the two 
others were Japheth and Shem – whose successors were the alleged 
Aryans and Semites respectively. In Genesis 10.6 it is written that the 
Hamites include the people from Cush, Egypt, Phut and Canaan. The 
interpretations of the Hamites have undergone several changes, and in 
the early nineteenth century the Hamites were seen as Caucasians – 
whites in black skin. They were not like the other Africans, thus 
linking the Egyptian civilisation to the Bible and the Middle East. The 
Hamites became the great “civilisers” of Africa (Mamdani 2001: 82-
6). 
The denial of African engagements and agencies was also a con-
sequence of the theoretical paradigm explaining cultural change. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, the paradigm explaining change 
was firmly based on ideas of diffusion and migration. Even the sim-
plest inventions were not believed to have taken place more than once 
and at least not repeatedly. The distinguished Swedish archaeologist 
Oscar Montelius became one of the most prominent exponents for the 
ex oriente lux (‘light from the East’) school, where the origin of 
European civilisation in the Bronze Age could be traced to the civil-
isations in the Near East, a view which also appealed to many 
Christians and their biblical view of world history (Trigger 1994: 151, 
160-1). 
Thus, the understanding of the Western past during the Bronze 
Age, as diffusion from the Near East, was unproblematic since it was 
also part of a Christian ideological hegemony, and the ‘real’ origin of 
the European civilisation was seen as Classical Greece. The role of 
Africa, nonetheless, remained passive and ‘backward’. By the high 
point of colonialism during the first third of the twentieth century, the 
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ancient Egyptians were seen as explorers, missionaries, traders and 
colonists as well as rulers, who brought enlightenment from ancient 
Egypt to the rest of the Dark Continent. As Thurstan Shaw says, one 
may “wonder whether it is no coincidence that this particular theory 
of diffusionism emerged out of the heydays of the French and British 
Empires in Africa, when Western Europeans saw themselves as 
undertaking a mission civilisatrice” (Shaw 1989: 5), or as assuming 
“the white man’s burden”, as framed by Kipling, spreading enlighten-
ment in the same way they perceived the ancient Egyptians did 
(ibid.). 
The diffusionist explanation that the Egyptian civilisation came 
from the Near East or Asia was later abandoned on archaeological 
grounds. Gordon Childe (1934) and Henri Frankfort (1956) conduct-
ed comparative studies of the civilisations of ancient Egypt and 
southern Mesopotamia, and both concluded that the civilisations had 
developed in distinct ways and were fundamentally different. In fact, 
all early civilisations have developed substantially independently, 
including those of ancient Egypt and the Yoruba in West Africa 
(Trigger 2003). And although Jared Diamond (1997) places a ques-
tion mark over it in his best-seller, Guns, Germs and Steel, he treats 
the Sahel, Tropical West Africa and Ethiopia (but not Egypt) as 
potentially independent sources of early agricultural innovations.  
We can now confidently say that the ancient Egyptian civilisation 
had its independent origin in the African continent. From the perspec-
tive of African engagements and agencies, the colonial perceptions 
expressed by, for instance, Hegel have been turned upside down by 
proponents such as Cheikh Anta Diop (1974), who argued that the 
Egyptians were black, and Martin Bernal’s Black Athena (Bernal 
1987, 1991), which argued that ancient Greece and European civil-
isation have their roots in Black Africa and Egypt and that Greek 
islands were colonised by Africans. Whereas Diop mainly focused on 
contact between Egypt and Sub-Saharan Africa, Bernal emphasised 
contact from Egypt towards the north, the west and the east. Both 
authors work within the paradigm of diffusionism. 
Bernal has admitted that part of his Black Athena project was to 
lessen European cultural arrogance (Bernal 1987: 73), and – as such – 
part of pure politics. These studies together with others have stimu-
lated Afro-centricism and other African nationalist ideologies aiming 
to take back African history and civilisation to Africa, a history in 
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which Africans play an active and central innovative role (e.g. Chami 
2002; van Binsbergen, forthcoming). 
Hence, one has two opposite and radical views on African en-
gagements on African terms: on the one hand, the extreme colonial 
and derogatory view of Africans without engagement and cultural and 
technical capability for innovation and development, and on the other 
hand, the independent and positive engagements of Africans influ-
encing past and present Europe and the world. These views are at 
odds owing to history and ideology. The first view was purely racist; 
and although the latter may also have the potential to be so, it could 
be seen more as a reaction to a past which deprived Africa and Afri-
cans of history, independent development, and even humanity.  
The works of Diop, for instance, have been heavily criticised on 
academic grounds; but they have, however, as Martin Hall pointed 
out, “been highly effective in demolishing the tenets of colonial his-
tories of Africa” (Hall 1986: 37). Or in other words, such works have 
been part of creating and enabling an intellectual space where African 
engagements and agencies have an independent and active role.  
The ideas of the colonial past are still remarkably alive today, as 
can for instance be seen from the speech by French President Sarko-
zy, in Dakar in 2007, in which he stated among other things that 
“[t]he tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into 
history”, noted by Achille Mbembe as reflecting an attitude “worthy 
of the 19th century” (Ba 2007). Of course, this example is a glaring 
one; but still, traces of the colonial heritage continue to pop up in 
many instances. One can think of the media, in which Africa most 
often appears only as a continent of crisis and in which Africans are 
rarely portrayed as citizens but instead mainly figure as anonymous 
masses and passive victims. Even in serious academic work, we 
should be aware of echoes of colonial thinking. Why is Africa, for 
instance, so remarkably absent from the mainstream works on global-
isation? Speaking more generally, and as is underlined by Ferguson 
(2006: 16), Africa is still seen as the “radical other”, the dark con-
tinent, where developments are (and should be) copies of Western 
models. These Western models figure as the first and official version 
of how things should be done, and doubts always remain whether the 
African copy is real and ‘real development’ or only a shadow of what 
it seems to be and should be (think of concepts like ‘façade’ and 
‘failed’ states). This is not to argue that we should do away with ana-
lytical concepts that may help to understand developments in Africa, 
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but that we should use them with caution and reflect on the premises 
underlying them. In addition, and as underlined by De Bruijn, Van 
Dijk & Gewald (2007), for instance, putting an accent on agency does 
not mean that structural factors that have an impact on the oppor-
tunities and possibilities of African actors should be omitted from the 
analysis. Olukoshi, Ouédraogo & Sall (2010) show how to build on 
this premise in their construction of a project for the ‘Africa of to-
morrow’.  
Returning to archaeology, which was our entry point in this sub-
section, the African continent as it is understood today, from the 
cradle of humanity to the dawn of civilisation and on to the present 
time, shows technological, social, cultural, political and religious in-
novations, and developments and achievements which have changed 
Africa and been part of world history. Throughout history, Africa has 
been engaging in the Near East, Europe, Asia and, later, America on 
diverse terms. In today’s multipolar world, these engagements take 
new forms and face new challenges. But they also ask for a new 
interpretation of history and more emphasis on encounters between 
Africans and other human populations, encounters that have hitherto 
been marginalised. For instance, one may expect more (and often 
controversial) (re)discoveries in the years to come about the relation-
ships between Africa and Southeast Asia (cf. Dick-Read 2005) or the 
Arab world (Bennafla 2000; Robinson 2004; Soares & Otayek 2007) 
also feeding political-cultural sentiments of brotherhood and partner-
ship. 
The contributions to this volume: African engagements, trajectories 
and opportunities in an emerging multipolar world  
This book is organised in three parts that try to throw light on dif-
ferent aspects of the questions asked in the foregoing but also inquire 
into how these aspects are interlinked. The first part, Chapters 2-7, 
describes and analyses new trends and tendencies in Africa. Some of 
these, however, are intensifications of old ones. Of particular interest 
is whether such trends and tendencies relate to the emergence of a 
new economic and political space for Africa, and what interests or 
powers are capturing, or trying to capture, this space. Are these trends 
externally or internally driven, and do they constitute an alliance 
between Africa and external interests – and if so, with what conse-
quences for Africa? 
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The second part, Chapters 8-13, addresses the macro level by in-
quiring into the framing of multipolarity. What forces or interests, 
countries and/or continents are framing the new global economic and 
political multipolarity, what is the content of multipolarity, and what 
space does it provide for Africa’s engagements on its own terms? Or 
is Africa only responding to new initiatives generated externally? 
From an African point of view, it is the diversification of potential 
partners or alliances created by the move towards multipolarity that is 
of interest. The book attempts to address these questions through 
analysing different aspects related to initiatives and interventions by 
China, India, Europe, and the US, and also the relations between 
them. Are the Chinese interventions in Africa complementary to the 
European ones, or are they competing with them? Is India different 
from China in terms of its interventions? Does Africa play a role for 
the Obama Administration, or is the US government mainly focussed 
on internal problems and the waging of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?  
The third part, Chapters 14-16, focuses more specifically on the 
potential for Africa and Africans to fill the political and economic 
space that is a result of the emergence of global multipolarity and 
globalisation. The focus is also on how African values and needs 
ought to influence the new global context. But, has this space already 
been circumvented by the new trends and tendencies addressed in the 
chapters of Part I, or the way multipolarity has been played out, as 
analysed in Part II? Is Africa entering a new historical period that 
cannot be fixed in terms such as pre-colonial, colonial or post-colo-
nial? 
Part I: New trends and tendencies in Africa 
It is argued by Derbe (Chapter 2) that the most important initiative to 
define the position of Africa and Pan-African politics in the post-Cold 
War period is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD). It is claimed that NEPAD represents an attempt by a 
transnational alliance of African political and corporate elites to rule 
by intellectual and moral persuasion, rather than by coercive power. 
The shaping of NEPAD was based both on African governments and 
foreign agency; however, African intellectuals and civil society chal-
lenged NEPAD and tried to present an alternative vision for Africa. 
The critique of NEPAD is related to its elite and top-down-driven 
inception and the fact that it was submitted to the G8 for approval and 
funding. And further, it is claimed that its neoliberal character and 
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reliance on foreign aid lead to a reproduction of the colonial depend-
ency relationships (Adedeji 2002). NEPAD is also seen, in critiques, 
as the culmination in the conceptual shift in North-South relations 
from ‘cooperation’ to ‘partnership’. Each successive step in this di-
rection has reduced the autonomy of recipient countries, to the extent 
that ‘partnership’ as a principle of international interdependence no 
longer serves Africa.   
Derbe also refers to the consensus of CODESRIA and Third World 
Network Africa about NEPAD that “current African economic prob-
lems emanate from the international order and its division of labour”, 
which act to reinforce “domestic weaknesses deriving from socio-
economic and political structures”. The policy measures urgently 
needed for Africa’s recovery include (i) stabilisation of commodity 
prices; (ii) reform of the international financial system, the World 
Bank, and the IMF, and an end to Structural Adjustment Programmes; 
(iii) fundamental changes to the existing WTO regime, as well as 
reversal of its attempt to include investments, competition and gov-
ernment procurement in trade negotiations; and (iv) debt cancellation. 
The subsequent African Civil Society Declaration for Africa (2004) 
proposes that an alternative vision for Africa should be based on the 
principles of human rights, self-reliance, and Pan-Africanism, and the 
construction of a participatory state (Bond 2005).  
Basing his analysis on a neo-Gramscian theory, Derbe finds that 
NEPAD’s function is to legitimise accumulation of surplus by an Af-
rican capitalist class in alliance with global corporations and donors. 
NEPAD’s architects are seen as co-actors rather than intermediaries in 
this transnational capitalist alliance. African regional and national 
politics are not simply passive actors for passing on of external 
initiatives and changes. Hence there is, according to Derbe, a need to 
re-examine or recalibrate concepts such as passive revolution and 
hegemony as ideal typologies, in order to capture nuances and vari-
ations in Africa’s external relations.  
NEPAD’s vision for Africa emphasises efficiency and capital ac-
cumulation at the expense of social equity and satisfaction of basic 
human needs. But it still requires support from international donors to 
provide material concessions in order to offset radical opposition. In a 
situation of donor fatigue and deep poverty, such concessions will not 
suffice. Increasing food and energy prices will make the situation 
even more precarious. Hence, NEPAD’s capacity to co-opt a broad 
spectrum of social classes in Africa will be severely constrained. 
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Simultaneously, the space will gradually open for counter-hege-
monic resistance to the prevailing social and political order. Recent 
developments in North Africa and Arab countries, including Tunisia 
and Egypt, illustrate the real possibility of social movements to 
initiate changes from below. The African states thus need to make use 
of other mechanisms to protect their hegemony. 
A rather new trend to this effect, according to Schouten (Chapter 
3), is the rapid expansion of private security companies. In contrast to 
others, Schouten argues that private security does not represent a 
‘hollowing out’ or retreat of the African state in favour of market 
forces. Instead, it indicates a reconfiguration of the political ordering 
of economic interactions. The expansion of private security compa-
nies (PSCs) is best understood through a critical questioning of the 
spatial spread of PSCs around certain spheres of economic activities. 
Through two case studies in South Africa and the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, Schouten finds that a PSC at the micro level represents 
“a pivotal agency shaping the interaction between formal and in-
formal exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa”, where the PSCs reproduce 
a militarised yet contested front line “between on the one hand a 
formal, legalistic, and neoliberal Africa compatible with global capi-
tal, and on the other an informal, useless Africa”. According to 
Schouten, too little emphasis has been paid to how the changing 
territorial organisation of security governance, often involving PSCs, 
relates to or is integrated in economic organisation. 
Schouten’s framework allows the analysis of the politics of private 
security on the same level and in the same global space as the state. 
Thus, new insights are offered into the character and role of the state. 
Schouten argues that PSCs represent the front-line between the 
formal/neoliberal and the informal sectors and help seal off economic 
activities from informal straddling and redistribution. This helps 
promote a more predictable economic environment, which can attract 
foreign investments in association with African elites. This discon-
necting of formal economic activities “from prevalent patterns of 
contestation over redistribution of gain that pervade the Congolese 
economy at large” (MacGaffey 1991) offers insights about the formal/ 
informal boundaries and the role of PSCs at the economic level. 
Schouten argues that the new private security topography is part and 
parcel of state formation in a decisive way. But does the expansion of 
private security necessarily lead to a stronger state? Could it not 
represent a framework for enhanced exploitation and appropriation of 
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resources and labour? Could it thus lead to a further weakening of the 
cultural and social ties of the African state? Protected elite accumu-
lation and consumption, through expansion of private security mecha-
nisms, may thus lead to a lowering of material concessions to the 
broader population. Thus, it could also work to create space for 
counter-hegemonic forces, as discussed by Derbe in the analysis of 
NEPAD.  
The contribution by Büscher (Chapter 4) on commodification or 
neoliberalisation of African nature indicates further pressures on Afri-
can smallholders, livestock groups and rural people. Withdrawal of 
productive land from African smallholders already began on a large 
scale under colonial rule. Indications are, however, that this process is 
intensifying for various reasons. Foreign interests, in alliance with 
African states, are pushing for enlargement of existing, and establish-
ment of new, game parks and wildlife reserves in order to promote 
global and ecological tourism. Climate change has, in addition, led to 
increasing international emphasis on global utilities (‘global common 
goods’). This has led to an international push for global commons, 
such as forests, conservation areas, and ecological systems belonging 
to the world and protected by international agreements. Such con-
servation initiatives represent a further encroachment on African 
smallholder land. Smallholders have to pay for the creation of global 
commons through restrictions on the use of their agricultural or 
pasture land, in spite of initiatives to create compensation systems. 
Büscher provides an interesting analysis of the new payment systems 
emerging for ecosystem- and climate-enhancing services. The idea of 
such payment or compensation systems is based on the notion that the 
value of ecosystems can be captured in monetary terms through 
market dynamics. Conservation and policy responses to reduce car-
bon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (carbon trade and REDD) are 
based on similar perspectives and function basically as instruments 
for tying conservation measures and mechanisms and capitalism 
closer together (Brockington et al. 2008).  
The process of commodification of African nature is also played 
out through foreign acquisitions of African land for production of 
food and energy. In Chapter 5, Evers et al. analyse aspects of this 
process in Madagascar. The process of global land acquisitions or 
‘land grabbing’ turned spectacular when news broke in 2009 that the 
South Korean company Daewoo was contemplating a 1.3 million 
hectare agricultural project in Madagascar. At the same time, the then 
 AFRICAN ENGAGEMENTS: ON WHOSE TERMS? 17 
 
 
Ravalomanana government was imposing a policy of foreign land 
investments and implementing a land reform purportedly to secure 
local land rights. The Ravalomanana government was forced out in 
March 2009 by the military and the current government partly due to 
the turmoil around the Daewoo project. In their contribution, Evers et 
al. focus on the realities encountered in the local setting when inter-
national and local stakeholders vie for the same plot of land. They 
find that the negotiation context of local communities in land deals is 
undermined by the asymmetry of power among the negotiating 
partners. Existing laws do not guarantee respect for local commu-
nities’ rights and interests. Local government and local elites seem to 
be ambivalent since foreign investors promise jobs and local infra-
structure in what are economically weak regions.  
Intensified land grabbing by foreign companies and states in 
Africa for food and energy production has led to concern about its 
social and environmental impacts (Matondi et al. 2011). So far, only 
proposals for voluntary recommendations for the process have been 
put forward. The direction of the international discussion – with the 
World Bank in the lead – is, however, couched in terms of ‘win-win’ 
and the possibility of ‘responsible land grabbing’ (World Bank 2010). 
The conditions for win-win situations, however – and as exemplified 
by Evers et al. – are limited in the context of existing global, national 
and local power relations. Many African governments, in any case, 
seem to embrace the process in the belief that large-scale foreign 
investments may lead to modernisation of agriculture and increase 
export incomes. The divide between African governments and Afri-
can smallholders thus stands out sharply and supports the analysis of 
Derbe (Chapter 2) that African elites are engaging with external 
interest in new ways and disregarding local interest. 
In Chapter 6, Nauta presents a case where a civil society or-
ganisation, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa, was 
able to fundamentally change things through a South-South alliance. 
By aligning itself with the Brazilian government and Brazilian and 
international NGOs, TAC was able to break the South African gov-
ernment’s refusal to widely distribute ART (antiretroviral therapy) 
medication. It was proved that access to life-saving medication was a 
viable solution even in a resource-poor setting. But a precondition 
had been that the Brazilian government had already broken the 
monopoly on high price HIV/AIDS medication of transnational 
pharmaceutical companies. Nauta reveals the strategies employed by 
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TAC in the mobilisation of global partners and examines the object-
ives of involvement from the Brazilian side. In addition, he shows 
that in the process of mobilising the support of Brazil – which Nauta 
refers to as the ‘significant other’ – TAC also became a valuable 
partner for Brazil and other global allies, as it inspired the global 
campaign for treatment access and demonstrated how being locally 
rooted could be married with global action. Nauta uses the case of 
TAC to reflect on the character of global activism and discusses its 
potentialities in the current era of emerging world powers and in-
creased access to modern communication. 
In Chapter 7, Mohamed Salih questions the relevance of the notion 
of ‘negotiations making use of multipolarity’ for one particular coun-
try, Sudan, after a major shift in government during the 1980s. He 
argues that Sudan presents the case of a country that has gone beyond 
negotiations with the West, by neglecting the West and building 
strong ties with Middle-Eastern and Asian parties. This has made 
Sudan a country with, on the one hand, rapid economic growth, being 
now one of the emerging ‘African lions’ – and, on the other hand, a 
country with major and violent conflict, particularly in the Darfur 
area and, before the peace treaty and the subsequent referendum in 
the South, also in many parts of Southern Sudan. After the separation 
of North and South Sudan into two independent states, it would be 
highly relevant to our theme of African engagements in a multipolar 
world to see how these countries go separate ways in playing off 
various global powers and establishing their own agency, even if it 
goes beyond (even much beyond) what is seen as morally acceptable 
by the ‘international community’ in terms of human rights violations. 
Part II: Framing multipolarity 
In 2009 Elisabetta Martini stated that multipolarity has been recog-
nised as “a fact of the existing international order” (van der Lugt, this 
volume). However, there does not yet seem to be any consensus about 
the meaning of the term. In this section of the book, Chapters 8-13, 
different contributions approach the term through different subject 
areas and approaches. The aspiration is to examine perspectives, 
actions and initiatives by most of the major global actors – China and 
India in Asia, Europe/EU, and the US – so that the term multipolarity 
can be given a more concrete content. A particular focus is on the 
implications of the framing of multipolarity for Africa and how Africa 
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and its institutions respond and engage with the emerging multipolar 
reality.  
In Chapter 8, Van der Lugt explores the link between the position 
of a country in the world order and its perspectives on humanitarian 
intervention, in the context of a shift in the world system towards 
multipolarity. She does so with a particular focus on the role of China 
in the increase of power of African governments to exercise sover-
eignty. 
Since the Cold War, the West has been dominant culturally, eco-
nomically and militarily, and it could therefore set the dominant dis-
courses and the structure of the international community and inter-
national law. However, as Van der Lugt illustrates in her contribution, 
the position of the West is declining, and it now has to share power 
with emerging nations. In addition, China’s increasing influence on 
and cooperation with Africa has led to a change in the attitude of the 
West towards the continent.  
A major point advocated by Van der Lugt is the impossibility in 
the current context of holding on to the idealistic picture of an “inter-
national order based on systemic and rule-based multilateralism”. The 
European Union (in 2008) proposed that China just needed to comply 
with international law in order to make multilateralism efficient. But 
the EU is not in a position to put forward such demands, and the 
perception by the West that international law can remain constant is 
considered naive. According to Van der Lugt, the changes in global 
power relations will result in changing international laws, in which 
national sovereignty will gain precedence over humanitarian inter-
vention. This development will increase the potential for African 
governments to engage in international affairs and to exercise sover-
eignty.  
This is exemplified, firstly, by China’s rising influence, which 
means a renegotiation of the share of voting power in multilateral 
organisations and the representation of other than European and 
North American norms and values in international law. China’s sup-
port for African countries’ demands for a seat on the Security Council 
reflects the depth of their cooperation. Secondly, the rise of China and 
other emerging powers has led to more than two global powers, 
which means that a good relationship with one of them is no longer 
sufficient to circumvent interference in one’s own national issues. 
This means a higher risk of intervention, which will translate into a 
higher appreciation for sovereignty internationally. 
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Olsen (Chapter 9) puts forward a different analysis of the relations 
of Europeans and Chinese with Africa. Olsen argues that if coop-
eration is to prevail between China, the EU and the African Union, 
the actors must share a minimum of common norms, values and 
interests. The chapter sets out to identify the development of such a 
consensus by looking at three areas: (i) interests with a focus on 
promotion of regional order in Africa; (ii) presence of common values 
and norms, through analysing security interventions of the three 
actors; (iii) development aid intervention aimed at economic and 
social development. 
As for development interventions, Olsen refers to China’s explicit 
support for NEPAD. Some observers interpret this as Beijing de facto 
encouraging Africa to accept liberalised capitalism and not an alter-
native model for the continent (Taylor 2010: 63). The overall con-
clusion regarding development interventions is that “both China and 
the EU share the same goals in Africa when it comes to economic and 
social development”. In addition, there seems to be a ‘securitisation’ 
of the approach – i.e., an emphasis on security and the appeasing of 
conflicts. China and the EU share an interest in stability and order, 
and they also agree upon the norm of demanding official UN backing 
in cases of deploying armed forces in conflict situations in Africa. But 
Olsen also refers to possible dissensions between the EU and China 
over Africa relations.  
As to what the above findings imply for African engagement, 
Olsen refers to the Paris Declaration of 2005, aimed at increased reci-
pient country influence and enhanced aid efficiency. The signing of 
this declaration by the EU meant that it committed itself to switch 
from conditionalities as critical policy instruments to giving more 
weight to the development objectives of the recipient countries. China 
has also signed the Paris Declaration. However, whereas the EU 
officially feels bound by the rules of the Paris Declaration, China 
does not, according to Olsen. In addition, a number of observers 
maintain that Beijing tries to organise its aid system in ways that are 
parallel to the norms of the West. So, as Olsen points out, the bottom 
line is that “the picture is mixed as far as the development inter-
ventions are concerned”. So, perhaps China after all is competing 
with the EU in relation to Africa rather than supplementing it in 
important areas? This may also give a perspective on the recent lack 
of interest in fulfilling the terms of the Paris Declaration by European 
countries, a fact also noted by Olsen.  
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Brautigam’s (2008) empirical analyses confirm that China oper-
ates ‘outside the global aid regime’, in the sense that its assistance 
would not qualify as aid according to the criteria set by OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). China is stated to prefer 
bilateral arrangements with a close tie between aid and politics. This 
means that aid is often tied to deliveries from China and that it is 
project-based. Moreover, Beijing uses a whole range of financial in-
struments in combination, so that it is difficult to isolate Chinese 
development aid from other economic development instruments. The 
speed with which China’s support and engagements have developed 
in Africa means that China is conscious about the effectiveness of its 
aid, and, in addition, China is very proud of a long record of support 
to useful projects in response to requests by African leaders (Brauti-
gam 2008: 30). This shows that the engagement of China in Africa is 
not of recent date, although its character and intensity have changed. 
The contribution by Liu & Monson (Chapter 10) analyses aspects 
of one of these old and useful development projects, the TAZARA 
railway between Tanzania and Zambia. The African leader who re-
quested Chinese support was the then president of Tanzania, Julius 
Nyerere. The US had first been approached to build the railway, but 
they declined. The construction of TAZARA took place between 1968 
and 1975 and resulted in an impressive railway line being opened 
between Dar es Salaam and New Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia in 1976. 
For Zambia, a land-locked country, the line was seen as vital to its 
copper exports, during a time of contested relationships with its 
southern-African neighbours. The railway is 1,680 km long and was 
built with financial and technical assistance from China, amounting to 
more that 400 million USD. The Tanzanian workforce declined from 
35,900 to 13,600 between 1972 and 1974 while the Zambian in-
creased from 2,100 to 13,000 during the same period.  
But China not only engaged in the construction of the railway. 
From 1976 until the present, a period of 35 years, China has provided 
technological and other guidance to TAZARA through so-called 
Chinese railway expert teams (CRETs) on two-to-three-year contracts 
based in Tanzania. The number of advisors in such teams has declined 
gradually from nearly 1,000 during 1976-8 to around 200 during the 
period 1989-92, to the current level of seven advisors during 2007-12. 
The chapter shows the commitment and consistency of Chinese 
support to TAZARA over time, even in periods when technical assist-
ance to Tanzania from other regions, such as the Nordic countries, 
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was found to be counterproductive (Forss et al. 1988). CRETs’ coop-
erative agreement with TAZARA also welcomed experts from West-
ern countries – e.g., to implement the Ten Years’ Development 
Programme along the railway starting in 1985. Until the late 1990s, 
Western donors funded 140 million USD in support projects for 
TAZARA, including the US, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, 
and others. 
The CRET protocols signed by the Chinese, Tanzanian and Zam-
bian governments over time have consistently emphasised technolo-
gical cooperation rather that technology transfer. However, during the 
early stages of operation, the CRET experts were powerful and could 
also make final operational decisions. With the Tanzanian crises from 
the late 1970s onwards, problems also emerged for the TAZARA rail-
way, and in 1983 the Chinese Premier Zhao during a visit to Tanzania 
called on Chinese experts again “to participate in daily management 
of the railway, shoulder by shoulder with African friends”.  
The pride about TAZARA was not only Chinese. To a large extent 
the railway, at least from a Tanzanian perspective, was considered a 
nation-building project. The chapter shows, through study of life his-
tories of TAZARA workers in different capacities, how these workers’ 
identity and consciousness were formed by the project and how their 
skills could not be replaced. Dr. Issa Shivji, when defending the first 
300 TAZARA workers who were laid off in 1982, successfully used 
these qualities in his defence and had the workers reinstated. How-
ever, at later stages, TAZARA was immersed in the general economic 
liberalisation and restructuring which led to increasing lays-offs of 
the work force. 
The chapter provides interesting evidence on the construction and 
operation of a major Chinese-supported project in Africa. However, it 
does not provide any evidence of the operational and economic 
efficiency of the railway over time. The project analysis is not suf-
ficiently broad to reveal financial and trade conditionalities connected 
to the project, which, as reported by Brautigam (2008), have conti-
nued into the current Chinese aid interventions in Africa. 
The contribution by Ong’ayo (Chapter 11) aims to analyse the 
implications of the absence of African civil society engagement in 
China-Africa relations and dialogue processes. It also attempts to 
inquire into the strategic engagement between African CSOs, the 
Chinese government, and Chinese CSOs over the role of China in 
Africa. The analysis shows that NGOs lack knowledge of the context-
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ual realities in both China and Africa. This knowledge gap acts as an 
obstacle to constructive and effective civil society engagement in 
China-Africa relations. It also weakens the potential for engagement 
with governments on fundamental issues related to China’s interven-
tions in Africa.  
The contribution, however, also acknowledges a power gap re-
garding civil society dissent and initiatives both in China and Africa 
in relation to their respective governments. It is stated that although 
the Chinese government’s response to dissent was brutal in the past, 
in particular during the Tiananmen protests and in other regions of 
China, recent responses to CSOs in China have been less brutal, 
“even though cases of detention and constant surveillance can still be 
observed”. In Africa, CSOs have evolved over time, “through stifling 
conditions underpinned by authoritarianism and dictatorship”. Both 
African and Chinese CSO organisations have grown rapidly since the 
1980s, and their features and alliances have also shown increasing 
diversity. But the relationship between the state and civil society is 
characterised by continuous conflicts.  
Ong’ayo argues for the importance of data gathering and inform-
ation sharing in areas where Chinese involvement in Africa is being 
criticised, including workers’ rights, human rights’ situations in bila-
teral projects, and inter-governmental policies and agreements. Such 
contextual knowledge will not only increase the ability of CSOs to 
raise issues with the respective governments, but also, and possibly 
more importantly in the future, help collaboration with Chinese CSO 
counterparts in cross-continental solidarity initiatives. It is argued to 
be of critical importance that China-Africa relations do not take on 
the same forms as the relations with the West – i.e., where African 
opinions and voices were rarely accepted or heard.  
Vittorini & Harris (Chapter 12) address the responses of African 
governments to Indian investments. India has also emerged as a major 
player in the new multipolar world and particularly in Africa. India’s 
relations with Africa are, however, not new. Throughout history, In-
dian populations have settled in different regions of eastern and 
southern Africa. They have carved out for themselves an important 
role in trade and commerce owing to access to capital, skills and 
alliances at local and international levels. In the area of technical 
economic cooperation, India has long had relations with Africa (since 
the 1960s), which, however, were limited in comparison with Western 
aid and technical interventions during the 1960s and 1970s.  
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Currently India is underlining its exceptionalism in its trade and 
aid to Africa and the complementary actions of its mostly private-
sector investors. India is emphasising this feature not only in relation 
to China but also to the West. India is a democracy, which strives 
towards transparency in its international activities. Its relations with 
Africa are predominantly private enterprise-related and, in addition, 
India’s African engagement is based on capacity-building and human 
resource development. Affirmation of mutual interest, rather than 
altruism, and rejection of conditionality are core elements of its 
development assistance and relations which India and its authorities 
wish to underline.  
This has led to positive responses to Indian engagement by some 
African governments, and in a few instances even preferential treat-
ment. But the general trend seems to be that African ministers are 
reluctant to praise one outside party over another when benefits can 
emerge across the board. Ideologically, Vittorini & Harris do not see 
India and China promoting an alternative development model in 
Africa to that of the Western liberal framework that is on offer. Here 
they concur with Rye Olsen. However, there is a growing and general 
popularity amongst African leaders for the non-interference and 
mutual benefit approach of both India and China. Western countries 
are thus no longer seen to have their pre-eminent position in trade and 
aid, with enforced liberalisation through conditionalities. But, in 
addition, many African ministers and top-level administrators are 
trained in the West and may know (or want to know) little of options 
other than the liberal consensus offered by the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
The element that might be the most important for African res-
ponses to India is that of strategic considerations. India may provide a 
crucial third node of economic and political power across the African 
continent. The presence of India and China to complement the West 
(and Japan) – and others such as Brazil, South Korea, and Russia, 
which are also lining up – may provide more space to manoeuvre for 
African governments. Thus, there might be a possibility this time 
around that Africa will not be a by-stander in an external struggle 
over raw materials and political hegemony and fall prey to a new neo-
liberal scramble for Africa. But the outcome will depend on African 
agency, according to Vittorini & Harris, which again is linked to the 
depth of the changes associated with the enforced economic liberali-
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sation and democratisation during the brief era of the unipolar world 
order. 
The contribution by Schraeder (Chapter 13) focuses on US en-
gagements in Africa, using a historical perspective. This is conducted 
in a context in which the Obama Administration on the one hand is 
confronted by daunting challenges and on the other by extraordinary 
expectations. However, Schraeder shows that, historically, US foreign 
policy towards Africa has “demonstrated remarkable coherence and 
regularity despite the differences between Republican and Democrat-
ic administrations” (quoting Brian Winchester). The current period of 
US engagement with Africa, starting in 2001, is not unexpectedly 
called ‘war on terrorism: expansion or contraction?’. Schraeder is of 
the opinion that Obama will prioritise domestic and other internati-
onal priorities before Africa. However, recent developments in Tuni-
sia, Egypt and other North African and Arab countries are bound to be 
given priority by the US administration since they undermine the 
current US strategy of cooperation with repressive governments for 
security reasons. The recent development also hits at the foundation 
of the US’s Middle East peace strategy, where Egypt is and has for a 
long time been a critically important ally.  
Areas for US engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa are also econo-
mic, in particular safeguarding supplies of oil and strategic minerals 
from the continent. Schraeder, however, also reports about several 
new, and the expansion of old, foreign aid initiatives concerning 
Africa, including doubling of foreign assistance, continuation of the 
successful AIDS Relief programme (PEPFAR), and revival of support 
to international family-planning programmes. Obama entered office 
in 2009 mindful that the US had not played a sufficiently proactive 
role in the resolution of African conflicts, including the genocide in 
Rwanda and the Darfur crisis. Although Obama has underscored his 
administration’s intention to take a more proactive approach in Afri-
can conflict resolution, it is doubtful, according to Schraeder, whether 
this will occur, owing to the foreign policy challenges elsewhere. 
The main concern for the US administration in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, however, seems to be related to the security agenda. This is 
manifest in the creation of various task forces and counter-terrorism 
initiatives, which have been buttressed by a continent-wide Africa 
Command (AFRICOM), expansion of the International Military Edu-
cation and Training (IMET) and other US military aid programmes, 
and the Gulf of Guinea Initiative. The primary goal of the latter 
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initiative is to establish over time an effective regional security pro-
gramme capable of ensuring safe transport of oil to the United States. 
The primary target for US foreign policy, however, is not unsurpris-
ingly those countries in which core foreign policy interests intersect, 
such as Algeria – an important regional oil power considered crucial 
by the US in combating perceived terrorist threats in North Africa. 
Part III: New space for African engagement? 
According to Amoah (Chapter 14), the near universal and dominant 
sway of neoliberal ideas in the political and economic spheres over 
the last three decades has come under intense scrutiny following the 
global economic crisis of 2007-9. The crisis and the subsequent 
responses by the global North to the financial meltdown have created 
a policy window for African polities to reclaim their autonomous 
policy-space in a multipolar world. One important reason for the 
meltdown, according to Amoah, was the liberalisation of financial 
markets during the last few decades, which led to excesses and wide-
spread misuse of such markets for rent-seeking. In his contribution, 
Amoah analyses policy responses of leading centres of neoliberal 
thought to the global financial crisis and the implications for public 
policy formation in Africa. Drawing from his concrete findings of the 
pervasive influence of neoliberal ideas in Africa, he argues that policy 
makers and intellectuals in Africa have not paid sufficient heed to 
Susan Strange’s admonition that “power derived from the knowledge 
structure is the one that has been most overlooked and underrated” 
(Strange 1988: 115). Such knowledge is, according to Strange, no less 
important that the other three sources of structural power: military, 
production and finance. 
Amoah in his analysis finds that the 1970s were marked by poli-
tical instability, which undermined continuity and creativity in public 
policy making. The tendencies towards autonomy in Africa had by 
the 1970s and 1980s “all but atrophied”. The neoliberal public polity 
thinking had presented government intervention in any shape or form 
and under whatever conditions in Africa as unacceptable. Amoah 
further finds that the policy responses of governments in the global 
North to the financial crisis indicate that neoliberal tenets are not 
consistently applied and “reflect ideological proclivities and prefer-
ences which undermine any universalistic, axiomatic and monothetic 
pretensions”. 
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Amoah sees multipolarity not merely as the re-diffusion of poli-
tical and economic power at the global level but as critically linked to 
the legitimacy of ideas. Multipolarity is about the contest of ideas. 
The unfolding of the global financial crisis presents to Amoah a vital 
policy window for African intellectuals and policy makers “to begin 
the task of inventive policy formation beyond the hegemony of neo-
liberal ideas”. According to Amoah, Africa needs a new mind, mean-
ing a fresh understanding of public policy formation derived from 
Africa’s worldview. The construction of this mind should begin with 
three building blocks of critical realisations: (i) public policy forma-
tion over the last three decades has been driven by neoliberaism; (ii) 
the multipolar world provides Africa with the opportunity to craft her 
own public policy approaches in response to her existential chal-
lenges; and (iii) African policymakers and intellectuals need to 
provide sufficient agency for self-conscious public policy approaches 
to emerge. Amoah, however, does not discuss in detail the possible 
obstacles mentioned by Vittorini and Harris that most African leaders 
and top administrators are educated in the West, embracing and fully 
internalising Western patterns of thinking. This may constitute a great 
challenge for the capacity to develop the knowledge and independ-
ence required for Africans to chart an alternative development path. 
This problem is also alluded to in Derbe’s analysis of NEPAD in 
Chapter 2. 
Ugwuanyi (Chapter 15) sets out to highlight the complexity in 
engaging Africa for development in its global demand and to arti-
culate the need for an ideological re-birth of Africans for this purpose. 
Pointing to the diversity of factors that should be addressed for “a 
proper protection of African humanity”, factors that are partly poli-
tical, partly psychological, partly economic, partly cultural, and partly 
related to racism, he asks himself: “What idea of globalisation will 
lead to the realisation of the African dream of harbouring a pros-
perous people in the world within the demands of modernity?”. The 
objective is to search for an ideology that can appropriate the gains of 
globalisation to an African advantage and pioneer and promote 
African unity by “reconnecting Pro-African minds (interpreted as all 
who are interested in African development) in its global demands”.  
According to Ugwuanyi, the African response to globalisation 
should take a reconstructive approach, and his objective is to initiate 
this. The approach or ideology is termed glo-fricanisation, which 
believes in the need to reconfigure the idea of African unity around 
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“specific needs and interests through which even non-Africans can 
contribute to the African development and that it is by this recon-
figuring that globalisation can be made to provide a relevant effect in 
African life”. 
Ugwuanyi identifies two significant items that characterise global-
isation: (i) a cultural dislocation of mankind by values constructed by 
certain items of modernity; and (ii) a relocation of this culture to a 
cultural centre (defined as a basis of evaluation and identity), which 
itself is defined by a universal network of human aspirations. In 
essence, this translates to what can be called global needs and desires, 
the response to and the provision of which amounts to globalisation. 
After outlining the different aspects of globalisation, Ugwuanyi ad-
dresses the question related to promises of globalisation in Africa. 
What are the specific gains that Africans stand to gain from glo-
balisation? The first to be anticipated is that it should lead to full 
adoption and adaptation of African concerns as global concerns. The 
second implication is that African values and principles should be 
sought after and desired in the construction of global values. It should 
also be anticipated that globalisation should add considerable value to 
African labour and resources. There should also be a higher value 
attached to consumption, as much as to production, and to consumers 
as much as to producers.  
In his proposal, Ugwuanyi states that African development needs 
should lead to a coalition of the world community. Thus Pan-
Africanism has to expand to provide space for the inclusion of non-
Africans since this will lead to a better response to African problems. 
The other implication is the need to subordinate the idea of Pan-
Africanism to higher and worthier goals. There are at least two justi-
fications for glo-fricanisation: first, the large African Diaspora means 
that what could be termed African problems can no longer be isolated 
to problems of continental Africans; and second, there are many non-
Africans with a considerable level of empathy to the problems of 
African people, non-Africans who need to be encouraged to demon-
strate this interest.  
In the last contribution to the book (Chapter 16), Stephen Ellis 
introduces a controversial issue. As a matter of fact, most historians 
dealing with Africa’s history as well as other Africanists – and also 
journalists and public opinion leaders – use the colonial era as the 
watershed of historical periodisation. Africa’s long history is simply 
presented as having three periods: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-
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colonial. Ellis questions the relevance of doing this and presents a 
mind shift that could enable the ‘decolonisation of the mind’ as far as 
Africa is concerned, not only for Africans themselves, but also for 
Africanists in former colonising countries. The position Ellis takes is 
controversial, as it might easily lead to a downplaying of the im-
portance of the colonial era as just a ripple in the history of mankind. 
Particularly in countries like France, Portugal, and the UK it can 
strengthen sentiments downplaying the historical responsibility for 
the long-term impact of colonialism on Africa and on former colo-
nies. If colonialism was only a ripple, and of little long-term effects, 
why bother about its moral heritage? The issue is to find a balance 
between reframing the periodisation of history and acknowledging 
the relative importance of the era in which colonial institutions influ-
enced, often deeply, existing ‘African’ institutions. Probably it is high 
time to move away from the overwhelming importance of ‘1884’ and 
‘1960’ and to find more meaningful markers of decisive change. But 
this should not result in downplaying the European (and later, also 
American) roles in Africa’s history during the last few centuries. It 
may open windows, however, for becoming less myopic.  
Major issues and questions arise from the contributions to this 
book. Will the framing of the new multipolar world, as presented in 
Part II, and the new trends and tendencies in Africa, as spelled out in 
Part I, provide a space for global African engagement? What are the 
boundaries and alliances related to this space, and can they be used 
for negotiations that can promote African interests, values, and per-
spectives, as is particularly elaborated by Amoah and Ugwuanyi in 
Part III of the book? And then: what is ‘African’, and how should the 
scientific communities dealing with Africa reframe Africa’s history 
and place in the world? Indeed, Africa’s engagements with the world 
are currently being reshaped and revalued, and sometimes with 
breath-taking speed, but the political question behind this reshaping 
remains important: on whose terms? And with what impact for Afri-
ca’s prospects for improved well-being and self-determination. 
References 
Adedeji, A. 2002. ‘From the Lagos Plan of Action to the new partnership for African 
development and from the final act of the Lagos Plan to the constitutive act: 
whither Africa?’ Keynote address at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa. 
Nairobi: Kenya. 
Alden, C. 2007. China in Africa. London: Zed Books. 
30 TON DIETZ ET AL. 
Alden, C. 2008. ‘An Africa without Europeans’. in: C. Alden, D. Large & R. Soares 
de Oliviera (eds) China returns to Africa: A superpower and a continent em-
brace. London: Hurst and Co. 
Ba, D. 2007. ‘Africans still seething over Sarkozy speech’.  
 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/09/05/uk-africa-sarkozy-
idUKL0513034620070905 (Last accessed: March 2011). 
Barnes, S. 2005. ‘Global flows: Terror, oil & strategic philanthropy’, Review of Afri-
can Political Economy, 32(104/105): 235-252. 
Bennafla, K. 2000. ‘Tchad: L’appel des sirènes arabo-islamiques’, Autrepart 16: 67-
86.  
Bernal, M. 1987. Black Athena: Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization, Volume I: 
The fabrication of ancient Greece, 1785-1985. New York: Rutgers University 
Press.  
Bernal, M. 1991. Black Athena: Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization, Volume II: 
The archaeological and documentary evidence. New York: Rutgers University 
Press.  
Bond, P. 2005. Fanon’s warning: A civil society reader on Africa’s new partnership 
for development (2nd ed.). Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. 
Brautigam, D. 2008. China’s African aid. Transatlantic challenges. Washington DC: 
The German Marshal Fund for the United States. 
Brockington, D., R. Duffy & J. Igoe. 2008. Nature unbound. Conservation, capital-
ism and the future of protected areas. London: Earthscan. 
Chami, F. 2002. ‘The Swahili world’, in: F. Chami & G. Pwiti (eds) Southern Africa 
and the Swahili world, pp. 1-14. Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 
Studies in the African Past 2.  
Cheru, F. & C. Obi (eds). 2010. The rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, 
opportunities and critical interventions. London: Zed Books.  
Childe, V.G. 1934. New light on the most ancient east: The oriental prelude to 
European history. London: Kegan Paul. 
Clegg, J. 2009. China’s global strategy. Toward a multipolar world. London: Pluto 
Press. 
de Bruijn, M., R. van Dijk & J.B. Gewald. 2007. Strength beyond structure. Social 
and historical trajectories of agency in Africa. Leiden: Brill Academic Publish-
ers. 
Diamond, J. 1997. Guns, germs and steel. The fates of juman societies. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company. 
Dick-Read, R. 2005. The phantom voyagers: Evidence of Indonesian settlement in 
Africa in ancient times. Winchester: Thurlton Publishing.  
DIE. 2006. ‘Unstable multipolarity? China’s and India’s challenges for global gov-
ernance’, DIE Briefing Paper. Bonn: German Development Institute. 
Dietz, T. 2011. Silverlining Africa. From images of doom and gloom to glimmers of 
hope. From places to avoid to places to enjoy. Leiden: Leiden University. 
Diop, C.A. 1974. The African origin of civilisation: Myth and reality. Westport: 
Lawrence Hill.  
Dollar, D. 2007. Asian century or multi-polar century? Washington DC: The World 
Bank, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4174. 
Fagan, G. 2004. The rape of the Nile. Tomb robbers, tourists, and archaeologists in 
Egypt. Boulder: Westview Press. 
 AFRICAN ENGAGEMENTS: ON WHOSE TERMS? 31 
 
 
Ferguson, J. 2006. Global shadows. Africa in the neoliberal world order. Durham 
and London: Duke University Press. 
Forss, K., J. Carlsen, E. Frøyland, T. Sitari & K. Vilby. 1988. Evaluation of the 
effectiveness of technical assistance personnel financed by the Nordic countries. 
Copenhagen: Danish International Development Authority.  
Frankfort, H. 1956. The birth of civilisation in the near east. New York: Doubleday.  
Gibbon, P., K. Havnevik & K. Hermele. 1993. A blighted harvest. The World Bank 
and African agriculture in the 1980s. London and Trenton NJ: James Currey and 
Africa World Press. 
Hall, M. 1986. Archaeology of Africa. Cape Town: David Philip.  
Hegel, G.W.F. 2007 [1899]. The philosophy of history. New York: Cosimo. (German 
original published in 1837, based on Lecture Notes at the University of Berlin be-
tween 1822 and 1830). 
Kaag, M. 2007. ‘Aid, umma and politics: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad’, in: 
R. Otayek & B. Soares (eds) Muslim politics in Africa, pp. 85-102. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kaag, M. 2008. ‘Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad: Islamic solidarity in the age 
of neoliberalism’, Africa Today 54(3): 3-18. 
Large, D. 2008. ‘Beyond “dragon in the bush”: The study of China-Africa relations’, 
African Affairs, 107(426): 45-61. 
Lee, M.C. 2006. ‘The 21st century scramble for Africa’, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, 24(3): 303-330.  
MacGaffey, J. 1991. The real economy in Zaire: The contribution of smuggling and 
other unofficial activities to national wealth. Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-
vania Press. 
Mamdani. M. 2001. When victims become killers. Colonialism, nativism, and the 
genocide in Rwanda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.  
Matondi, P., K. Havnevik & A. Beyene (eds). 2011. Biofuels, land grabbing and food 
security in Africa. London: ZED Books. 
Melber, H. & M.C. Lee. 2007. China in Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
Mepham, D. & L. Wild. 2006. The new sinosphere: China in Africa. London: 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Nolutshungu, S. 1996. Limits of anarchy: Intervention and state formation in Chad. 
Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia. 
Olukoshi, A., J.-B. Ouédraogo & E. Sall (eds). 2010. Afrique: Réaffirmation de notre 
engagement. Africa: Reaffirming our commitment. Dakar: CODESRIA, Policy 
Dialogue Series no. 1, 2010. 
Robinson, D. 2004. Muslim societies in African history. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Shaw, T. 1989. ‘African archaeology: Looking back and looking forward’, The Afri-
can Archaeological Review, 7: 3-31. 
Soares B.F. & R. Otoyek. 2007. Islam and Muslim politics in Africa. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Strange, S. 1988. States and markets: An introduction to international political eco-
nomy. London: Pinter Publishers. 
Taylor, I. 2010. ‘Governance and relations between the European Union and Africa: 
The case of NEPAD’, Third World Quarterly, 31(1): 51-67. 
Trigger, B. 1984. ‘Archaeologies: Nationalist, colonialist, imperialist’, Man, New 
Series, 19(3): 355-370. 
32 TON DIETZ ET AL. 
Trigger, B. 1994. A history of archaeological thought. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.  
Trigger, B. 2003. Understanding early civilizations. A comparative study. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.  
van Beek, W.E.A. 2007. ‘The escalation of witchcraft accusations’, in: G. ter Haar 
(ed.) Imagining evil. Witchcraft beliefs and accusations in contemporary Africa, 
pp. 293-315. Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press Inc.  
van Binsbergen, W. forthcoming. Black Athena comes of age. Berlin, Münster, Wien, 
Zürich, London: LIT Verlag. 
van Dijk, M.P. 2009. The new presence of China in Africa. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press. 
Vittorini, S. & D. Harris. 2009. ‘Slow, but steady, like the elephant’: The politics of 
Indian aid, trade and investment in West Africa’, paper presented at the 3rd 
European Conference on African Studies, Leipzig, 4-7 June 2009. 
World Bank. 1981. Accelerated development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Agenda for 
action. Washington DC: World Bank. 
World Bank. 1989. Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth. Wash-
ington DC: World Bank. 
World Bank. 2010. Rising global interest in farmland. Can it yield sustainable and 
equitable benefits? Washington DC: World Bank. 
Zagah, R. 2005. Economic growth in the 1990s – lessons from a decade of reform. 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
